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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
The Utah Supreme Court had jurisdiction of the initial appeal filed in this case 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(j) (2006). It assigned the initial appeal to the 
Utah Court of Appeals, which had jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(j) 
(2006). The Court of Appeals issued its decision on November 30, 2006. This Court 
granted the Okelberrys' petition for certiorari on March 15, 2007. Jurisdiction now lies 
with this Court under Utah Code Ann. 78-2-2(3)(a) (2006). 
ISSUE PRESENTED 
This Order granting certiorari review in this case characterized the issue on review 
as the following: "Whether the district court and court of appeals erred in their 
application of the standards for ascertaining a continuous use as a public thoroughfare 
pursuant to the Dedication Statute, Utah Code Ann. §72-5-104." 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Annotated Section 72-5-104 (1), "A highway is dedicated and 
abandoned to the use of the public when it has been continuously used as a public 
thoroughfare for a period often years." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature of the Proceedings 
The Okelberrys are appealing the court of appeals decision upholding the trial 
court's determination that certain roads crossing the Okelberrys5 property have been 
dedicated and abandoned to the public pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104 (1). 
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2. Course of Proceedings & Disposition Below 
On August 24, 2001, Wasatch County filed its complaint in the Fourth District 
Court alleging that certain roads—located on property owned by the Okelberrys, West 
Daniels Land Association, and the Utah Department of Wildlife Resources—had become 
public by operation of law. (R. 10) Wasatch County reached a settlement with the Utah 
Department of Wildlife Resources on or about September 23, 2003. (R. 247) West 
Daniels Land Association defaulted on a motion for Summary Judgment, and its default 
was entered. (R. 419) After denying Wasatch County's motion for summary judgment, 
the trial court held a bench trial between these two remaining parties on June 28, 29, and 
30,2003. (R. 357) 
At the conclusion of trial, the court found that evidence of abandonment was clear 
and convincing as to four of the five roads across the Okelberry property that the County 
claimed to have been abandoned to public use. (R. 425) However, after making that 
finding, the court then determined that the doctrine of equitable estoppel prevented the 
County from enforcing the public nature of these roads because up to twelve years had 
passed between the time the Okelberrys began locking gates on these roads and the time 
the County filed its complaint. (R. 423) Contesting the ruling on equitable estoppel, 
Wasatch County filed a motion to alter or amend judgment or to amend the findings of 
fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 52(b) and 59(e). 
(R. 421) Subsequently, the trial court issued supplemental findings of fact (R. at 489) 
but denied the County's motion to amend judgment. (R. 492) 
2 
Wasatch County appealed the trial court's decision regarding the application of 
equitable estoppel on April 22, 2005. (R. 495- 493) The Okelberrys cross-appealed the 
trial court's decision that the four roads had been abandoned and dedicated to the public. 
(R. 509-508) The Court of Appeals issued its decision on November 30, 2006, reversing 
the trial court's decision on equitable estoppel and upholding its decision on the 
dedication of the four roads. Wasatch County v. Okelbeny, 2006 UT App 473, 153 P.3d 
745. 
The Okelberrys filed a petition for writ of certiorari on January 2, 2007. This 
Court granted the petition on March 15, 2007. 
3. Statement of Relevant Facts 
Defendants are owners of vast tracts of real property located in Wasatch County. 
(R. 419) The property is mountainous terrain separating Wallsburg valley from state-and 
federal-owned forested land. (R. 418-419) The property is traversed by several 
interconnecting dirt roads, some of which continue into United States Forest land. (R. 
419-418) The public used these roads at will for at least 30 years. (R. 413) In the early 
19905s the Okelberrys began restricting access to the roads. (R. 488) In 2001, the 
County filed an action in District Court to enforce the public's rights to use the roads. 
(R.10) 
At trial, nine witnesses, a representative sampling of community users, testified 
that beginning in the 1950s they regularly and freely used the roads, typically for 
recreation and access to United States Forest Service property. They were never 
approached by the Okelberrys or their agents regarding their use of the roads. These 
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witnesses testified that although there were wire gates across the roads, they were 
typically closed only when livestock were present, and even then the}' were never locked. 
The witnesses testified that they were always able to use the roads; their collective 
uninterrupted use spanning over thirty years. (R. 413, 417) 
In the late 1980s or early 1990s the Okelberrys began selling "trespass permits," 
which allowed holders to use the Okelberry property for hunting. Later, in the early to 
mid-1990s, the Okelberrys placed their property into a Cooperative Wildlife Management 
Unit (CWMU), turning their property into an exclusive area for private hunting. (R. 416) 
In order to facilitate their trespass-permit policy, and later the CWMU, the Okelberrys 
began to lock the gates at the entrances to their property. It was at this time that the 
public first met with locked gates. (R. 413) 
After a three-day bench trial, the district court found the evidence to be clear and 
convincing that four of the roads had become dedicated and abandoned to the public 
pursuant to state law. (R. 413) The trial court found that although the Okelberrys had at 
various times in the past locked the gates and that there were some no-trespassing signs 
alongside the roads, the Okelberrys had not restricted public access to the roads 
themselves until the early 1990's, long after the roads had already been abandoned to the 
public. (R. 488) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court conducted three days of trial in this case. It listened to the 
witnesses, studied the exhibits, and assessed the credibility, weight, and persuasiveness of 
each. In addition, prior to trial and at the parties' request, the court personally toured the 
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roads together with counsel. Then, in light of all of the evidence, and applying the clear-
and-convincing evidentiary standard, it made findings of fact. It found that the public 
used four of the five roads in question continuously as they thought it necessary or 
convenient. It further found that the use was as a "public thoroughfare," with such use 
lasting for at least ten years if not multiple ten-year periods. The trial court then applied 
these clear and convincing facts to Utah's statute, concluding that the four roads had been 
abandoned and dedicated to the public. 
At the Okelberrys' request, the court of appeals reviewed the trial court's decision 
to determine whether there was sufficient evidence to support the factual findings and 
legal conclusions of the trial court. The court of appeals reviewed the sufficiency of the 
evidence under the clearly erroneous standard prescribed by this Court. After reviewing 
the entire record, it correctly determined that the trial court's factual findings were not 
against the clear weight of the evidence, and it appropriately held that the Okelberrys' 
arguments did not lead to a "firm and definite conclusion that the trial court had made a 
mistake." 
In reviewing the evidence in this case, the court of appeals indicated that, in a 
road-dedication case such as this, it sometimes becomes necessary to balance the 
frequency and duration of any road-closure against the amount and nature of the public 
use in order to determine whether the continuous use was disrupted. This is not a new 
standard. Utah's appellate courts have been applying this standard for many years, and 
the facts of this case do not justify overturning this precedent. 
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The Okelberrys' claim—that the court of appeals has created a fuzzy standard 
where there used to be clarity—is not supported by the case law. Actually, the appellate 
court at most clarified the standard found in the various cases. If this Court would now 
like to clarify it even further, it can do so without disavowing the precedent upon which 
our citizens have grown to rely, and without making an already heavy burden of proof 
even more difficult for our state and local governments to meet. 
Finally, the Okelberrys' issues that were not raised below—those arguing for a de 
novo review and for a constitutional taking based analysis—should not be considered and 
are not a basis for overturning the court of appeals decision in this case. 
ARGUMENT 
Introduction 
The issue on which this Court granted certiorari is, "Whether the district court and 
court of appeals erred in their application of the standards for ascertaining a continuous 
use as a public thoroughfare pursuant to the Dedication Statute, Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-
104." Wasatch County will first analyze the trial court's decision and then the court of 
appeals' decision in light of the issue as framed by this Court. 
I. The Trial Court Applied the Correct Standards to the Facts of the Case. 
1. Legal Standard for a Road Dedication under 72-5-104. 
The basis for a road dedication is found in Utah Code section 72-5-104(1), which 
states: "A highway is dedicated and abandoned to the use of the public when it has been 
continuously used as a public thoroughfare for a period often years." This Court has 
identified the elements required to be met for a dedication under the statute to occur. 
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These are: (i) continuous use, (ii) as a public thoroughfare, (iii) for a period often years. 
Heber City Corporation v. Simpson, 942 P.2d 307, 310 (Utah 1997). 
"Continuous use" is satisfied where the evidence demonstrates that the public 
"made a continuous and uninterrupted use o f the road "as often as they found it 
convenient or necessary." Id. at 311 (quoting Boyer v. Clark, 7 Utah 2d 395, 326 P.2d 
107, (1958)). Use as a "public thoroughfare" is established by evidence of the public's 
passing or travel on the road other than by permission or private right. Id. at 311. To 
become a public road, it must be continuously used as a public thoroughfare for ten years. 
And in order for a road to be dedicated under the statute, each of these elements must be 
proven by clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 310. The trial court found by clear and 
convincing evidence that these elements had been met in the present case. 
In order to show how the trial court applied the correct legal standard to its 
Findings of Fact, it is necessary to review briefly what the trial court found and what it 
did not find. 
2. The Trial Court's Findings of Fact 
The trial court issued two sets of findings of fact. First it issued its initial Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Later, in response to Wasatch County's motion to alter 
or amend, it issued supplemental findings of fact. Logic would dictate that both sets 
should be considered as a whole and if there are any conflicts between the two, the 
supplemental findings should control as being responsive to the post-trial briefing and 
argument performed by the parties. Some of the supplemental findings clarify the initial 
findings. 
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In the initial findings, the trial court makes several typical findings, but then 
makes some findings which state onl) that certain evidence was presented or claims were 
made by each party. These ''evidence presented" findings are contained in paragraphs 
11-17 of the trial court's initial findings of fact. (R. 416-417) These findings are 
presented without the trial court indicating which, if any, of the contradictory evidence m 
these "evidence presented" findings it believes. 
Later, in the conclusions of law section, the trial court does make it clear which 
parts of the "evidence presented" findings are most credible and how those credible facts 
apply to the statute. (R. 413-416) In these conclusions the trial court explains that clear 
and convincing evidence established that all the elements required by the dedication 
statute had been met. 
A. The Trial Court's "Even If' Statement Was Not a Finding that the 
Court Accepted the Okelberrys' Claims. 
The Okelberrys argue that the trial court found, and that the court of appeals 
assumed as true, that the Okelberrys had locked the gates on the road, had placed no 
trespassing sings on the gates, and that they or their agents had at times in the past ejected 
people found using the roads. This representation of the findings is only partially correct, 
and to the extent the court of appeals assumed that this was the trial court's finding or 
conclusion, it was mistaken. 
The language of the trial court which is the basis for the argument and 
misunderstanding is found in paragraph 4 of the initial conclusions of law. (R. 415) In 
that paragraph, the trial court states, "Taking even the Defendants5 factual assertions as 
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true, it is clear that individuals using the roads beginning in the late 1950s until the late 
1980s or early 1990s used the roads without interruption, they used the roads freely, and 
though not constantly, they used the roads continuously as they needed." (R. 415) 
The Okelberrys argue that this means that the trial court accepted all of their 
claims and assertions as true. This is incorrect. A close review of the Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law shows that the "factual assertions" that the trial court is 
considering in paragraph 4 are only those "factual assertions" of the Okelberrys which 
the court had just discussed in paragraph 3, which only included claims regarding locked 
gates and signs. (R. 415) 
The trial court's statement in paragraph 4 of its Conclusions of Law is an "even if 
for the sake of argument" legal analysis, and not a finding of fact. Not only does the 
language of the paragraph itself indicate that this so, but the context also supports this 
understanding: the court characterized the paragraph as a conclusion of law and not as a 
finding of fact. And as a legal conclusion, the court's statement—far from giving 
credibility to the Okelberrys5 claims—actually recognizes the overwhelming strength of 
the County's evidence. The trial court essentially observes that the County's evidence 
was clear and convincing enough that, even if certain Okelberry claims were true, the 
evidence would still require a conclusion that the four roads were dedicated to the public. 
Again, the critical factual finding supporting this legal analysis and conclusion of law is, 
"it is clear that individuals using the roads beginning in the late 1950s until the late 1980s 
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or early 1990s used the roads without interruption, they used the roads freely, and though 
not constantly, they used the roads continuously as they needed." (R. 414-415) 
However, even if this Court were to hold, as the Okelberrys argue and as the court 
of appeals may have assumed (Wasatch County v. Okelberry, 2006 UT App 473, \ 5, 153 
P.3d 745), that the trial court meant it was actually taking the Okelberrys' "factual 
assertions as true," it still only refers to the assertions made in paragraph 3. These 
assertions were merely that the gates were periodically locked for several days at a time 
and that some no-trespassing signs were present. The assertions referred to did not 
include any finding that the Okelberrys or their agents ejected people found using only 
the roads. 
To accept the Okelberrys' argument that the trial court accepted all their assertions 
as true presents an insoluble dilemma: the Okelberrys themselves gave contradicting 
evidence. For example, although Ray Okelberry testified that he locked the gates at times 
but, his brother and long time partner in the sheep operation, Lee Okelberry, testified that 
the gates were never locked. See infra, pp. 11-12 (discussion on locked gates) 
This analysis of the trial court's language in the initial findings of fact is supported 
by the supplemental findings of fact issued after post-trial motions. The supplemental 
findings of fact clarify any ambiguity which may exist in the initial findings regarding 
these issues. 
1
 While this statement is also located in the trial court's conclusions of law, the context 
indicates that it is the court's expression of the evidence that it believed. For further 
discussion of the trial court's organization of its findings and conclusions, see note 8, 
infra. 
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Specifically, in paragraph 5 of the supplemental findings of fact, the trial court 
found that, "at various times in the past, the Okelberrys and their employees have locked 
these gates." (R. 488) In paragraph 6 of the supplemental findings the trial court found, 
"The Okelberrys and their employees have posted "no trespassing" signs at various 
places along these roads." (R. 488) Then in paragraph 7 of the supplemental findings the 
trial court found, "Testimony was presented at trial indicating that the Okelberrys and 
their employees have at various times asked persons to leave the property surrounding the 
roads. Beginning in the 1990's, the Okelberrys began restricting access to the roads." (R. 
488) (emphasis added) 
This shows a very clear picture of the trial court's findings regarding the roads 
before the early 1990's: first, that the Okelberrys had at various times in the past locked 
the gates; and second that "no trespassing" signs had been placed "along the roads." 
And most importantly that prior to the 1990s the Okelberrys had asked persons to leave 
"the property surrounding the roads," but they did not restrict access to the roads 
themselves until the 1990's. 
3. The Findings Were Supported by the Clear Weight of the Evidence 
Presented at Trial. 
The clear weight of the evidence was exactly as found by the trial court. None of 
the witnesses called by Wasatch County ever saw any locks on any gates until the late 
1980s or early 1990s. See, e.g., R. 520 at 111-112 (testimony of James Besendorfer that 
he never encountered a locked gate until recent times.); R. 520 at 271, 273, 275, 278 
2
 Note that the court did not find that the gates were "periodically locked." It only found 
that at various times, the gates were locked, but not enough to stop continuous use. 
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(testimom of Ed Sabey that he never encountered a locked gate); R. 521 at 104.106, 107 
(testimony of Marl: Butter of not encountering locked gates). As noted by the trial court, 
not until the late 198(Ts or early 1990's did any County witnesses encounter locked gates. 
(R. 417) 
Even man)' of the Okelberrys9 witnesses testified that the gates were not locked 
prior to the tClate 80's or early 90's." Lee Okelberry testified that locks were not put on 
the gates while he was involved with the property (1950's through mid-1990's) and that 
he had never locked a gate. (R. 521 at 187, 196, 201). When shown a photograph of the 
lock on one of the gates, Lee testified, "I never had to go through it. I don't remember 
seeing that there. That's been put there after I left." (R. 521 at 201) Brian Okelberry 
also testified that he believed the first locks were not placed on the gates until at least the 
1980's. (R. 522 at 54) 
None of the witnesses called by Wasatch County were ever asked not to use the 
roads prior to the 1990's . Although the Okelberrys testified in detail to some instances 
of ejecting people who were off the roads and on their land surrounding the roads, they 
had no specific, detailed recollection of ejecting people from the roads themselves.3 
It seems that, at this stage of the case, the Okelberrys are trying to paint a picture 
of the evidence presented at trial as showing limited use by a few individuals. In fact the 
opposite was true. Wasatch County witnesses were a representative cross-section of the 
3
 There was one instance where an employee, Jeff Jefferson, testified that he asked Mark 
Butters and his brother to leave the roads. But he admitted that this happened in 2002 or 
2003 long after the relevant time period. Even the County7 admitted that the Okelberrys 
had begun blocking these roads by this time. (R. 521 at 150) 
12 
many local residents who all used the roads. This is shown in the testimony of Glen 
Shepherd who, though a witness for the Okelberry s, admitted that he had attended a 
meeting in Wallsburg at which there were "quite a few people" who all claimed to use 
these roads and wanted them kept open. Mr. Shepherd also testified that traffic had 
significantly increased the last ten years of the public's use. (R. 521 at 215) Mr. 
Shepherd, like many County witnesses, claimed to have used the roads for over 30 years. 
He actually testified that he used the roads "thousands of times," but that he now realized 
it was always with permission. (R. 521 at 222-223) 
Considerable insight is also gained from the testimony of Lee Okelberry that the 
last few years that he was involved with the property (the mid 1990's) "[t]here was more 
people all the time" using the roads. (R. 520 at 186) Lee Okelberry also testified that 
when the land was leased to a hunting group, "a bunch of people" signed some sort of 
document at the post office, disputing the closing off of the roads. (R. 521 at 199) It was 
this type of public pressure that finally led to the filing of this case. Moreover, several of 
the County's witnesses testified that when they used the roads they were often 
accompanied by others. See, e.g., R. 521 at 102 (testimony of Mark Butters that he used 
the roads with his family); R 520 at 157 (testimony of James Besendorfer that he used the 
roads with his father and two sons). The totality of this evidence clearly and 
convincingly demonstrated to the trial court that the four roads were used continuously as 
4
 It is instructive that Mr. Shepherd admitted that he had originally attended the meeting 
as a proponent to keep the roads open, but changed his mind between the meeting and the 
trial. It helps to point out that the only road the trial court found not to have been 
dedicated to the public, Maple Canyon Road, also crosses Mr. Shepherd's property near 
his house. (R 521 at 208-209) 
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a public thoroughfare for at least ten years both b> the witnesses who Testified at trial and 
by man) others. 
Also telling are the roads themselves. As part of this case the trial judge, along 
with counsel for the parties, visited the site and viewed these roads firsthand. (R. 522 at 
123, 266, 284, and 285) Photos of portions of the roads do not show unused and 
unusable tracts, but rather well worn dirt roads that even after having been closed to 
public use for several years show clear evidence of high traffic use for a mountain road. 
See, e.g.,, (Defendant's Exhibits 6, 85 13, 14, 15, 35, 45, 47, 53, 54, and 55) These roads 
appear on several state and Forest Service maps dating as far back as 1947. (R. 520 at 
15-18, and Exhibits 3, and 4) These roads are designated as U.S. Forest Service Roads 
on maps produced by the Forest Service and are shown as providing access to portions of 
Forest Service property. (R. 521 at 42-45; Plaintiffs Exhibit 17) 
4. The Okelberrys Failed to Marshal All of the Evidence Which Supports the 
Trial Court's Decision. 
In their brief before this Court, the Okelberrys have set out to marshal the 
evidence regarding the public's use of the road ostensibly to demonstrate its insufficiency 
in light of their "un-rebutted" evidence claims. (Petitioner's brief at 26-32) Although 
they marshal a great deal of evidence regarding iht frequency of the public's use of the 
road, they marshal virtually none of the evidence that rebuts their assertions regarding so-
called "interruptive acts," which they claim made the public's use of the roads non-
continuous. To correctly marshal evidence, they should have, "presented], in 
comprehensive and fastidious order, eveiy scrap of competent evidence introduced at 
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trial which supports the very findings the appellant resists." Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold 
Storage, 872 P.2d 1051, 1052-53 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (citation omitted) (emphasis 
added). 
The evidence supporting the trial court's finding that the four roads were used 
continuously includes the evidence that rebuts the Okelberrys5 allegations of interruption. 
This evidence was not marshaled. The Okelberrys assertions regarding "interruptive 
acts" were plainly contradicted by the testimony of their own witnesses. For example, as 
discussed, Lee Okelberry testified that the gates were not locked from 1957 through the 
mid-1990s, and that signs were not posted. (R. 521 at 187, 196, 199-201) The testimony 
cited above, of Glen Shepherd and Brian Okelberry, was not marshaled.5 And the 
testimony of Don Wood that Forest Service maps indicated that the four disputed roads 
were designated and numbered Forest Service roads was not marshaled. (R. 521 at 42-
45) 
Not only do the Okelberrys fail to marshal all of the necessary evidence, they also 
fail to show how the evidence is legally insufficient to support the trial court's finding; 
rather they simply present the evidence supporting their position and reargue its weight. 
Where evidence is inadequately marshaled, the court is to assume "that all findings are 
adequately supported by the evidence." Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, *{ 19, 100 P.3d 
1177. 
II. The Trial Court Applied the Correct Legal Standards to Its Findings of Fact. 
1. Locking of Gates 
5
 See supra, pp. 12-13 
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The evidence of locking the gates at various times prior to the 1990's wras 
provided solely by Ray Okelberry, who testified that he locked the exterior gates in the 
late 1950's. (R. 522 at 135) He also testified that he locked the gates when moving the 
sheep.6 (R. 522 at 138-139) The trial court's finding on this issue, and the only 
evidence which supported it, shows that the placing of locks on the gates was not 
intended to interrupt the use of the road, but it was meant only to keep the sheep together; 
and it shows that any closure of the roads was an incidental effect of the occasional 
shepherding of sheep. 
The trial court correctly applied the standard set forth in Thurman v. Biyam, 626 
P.2d 447, 449 (Utah 1981), wherein this Court held that periodic closing of a road in 
order to help in the movement of sheep did not interrupt the continuous use of the road. 
i 
This rationale is very appropriate when one considers the myriad ways a road can be 
temporarily blocked or closed to use. Climate conditions, natural disaster, road 
maintenance or repair, utility work, and other temporary interruptions can all cause short-
or long-term temporary road closures. Other, much shorter road closures can be caused 
by fallen trees, downed power lines, parades, unloading of trucks, stop lights, or even a 
crossing guard or person in a crosswalk. All of these occurrences will temporarily close a 
6
 As discussed above, Ray Okelberry's testimony was contradicted by the testimony of 
his brother, Lee Okelberry and his son Brian Okelberry (Supra pg 11-12) Neither Lee 
nor Brian Okelberry testified to locking the gates while moving sheep. Nor did the 
Okelberrys' employee, Jeff Jefferson. Therefore, not only was Ray Okelberry's 
testimony self-serving, it was entirely uncorroborated even by those intimately involved 
in the sheep-raising operation, let alone by the public who used the road as a thoroughfare 
to gain access to Forest Service land. 
16 
road, sometimes for extended periods. Some of these even involve intentional 
interruption of the public's use of a road. However, in each of these instances, including 
the temporary blocking of roads to move sheep, the road closure is only incidental to a 
separate primary purpose: moving sheep, repairing a road, putting in a water line, 
facilitating a special event, or ensuring the safety of pedestrians. 
Regardless of how the Okelberrys characterize it now, the purpose of any road 
closures found by the trial court to have occurred on the four roads at issue here was only 
to facilitate the movement of sheep. No finding supports the argument that the 
Okelberrys ever closed a road to interrupt its public nature or to foreclose the application 
of the road-dedication statute. 
2. No Trespassing Signs 
The trial court also found that "no trespassing" signs were placed along the roads. 
The court's finding that no trespassing signs were so placed supports the court's finding 
that the Okelberrys did not interrupt the use of the roads themselves until the early 
1990's. In order for such signs to have an audience at all, travelers must be traveling on 
the roads. The "no trespassing" signs conveyed, under those circumstances, a 
communication that such travelers should not depart the roads and travel on or occupy the 
land surrounding the road. The court's finding on this issue was supported by ample 
evidence. Some witnesses testified to seeing "no trespassing" signs on the Okelberry 
property in more recent years. They testified that it was their understanding that the signs 
applied only to the surrounding property, not the roads. See (R. 521 at 14) (testimony of 
Brandon Richins that he assumed that the signs referred to the property and that the roads 
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could continue to be used to access public lands); (R. 521 at 72, 91) (testimon) of Benny 
Gardner that he understood the signs to mean that he was not to get out of his truck and 
go onto the property); (R. 521 at 110) (testimony of Mark Buttars that he believed use of 
the roads was permissible as long as he stayed off the surrounding property). There was 
little evidence indicating that the signs referred to use of the road. 
The trial court found that "no trespassing" signs were placed "along these roads," 
(R. at 488), indicating that the Court found the credible testimony to be that signs were 
posted on the property alongside the roads and were to warn passersby that use of the 
property, not the roads, was prohibited. 
Again the trial court applied the correct standard. In Thwman, 626 P.2d 447, this 
Court noted that signs along a road indicating an effort to keep people off of the property 
surrounding the road were not interruptive acts which would avoid application of the 
dedication statute. Thurman, at 449. 
3. The Trial Court Did Not Make a Finding that the Okelberrys Ejected People 
Found Using the Road Prior to the 1990s. 
Most important is the finding that although the Okelberrys may have asked 
persons to leave the property surrounding the roads prior to the 1990's, they did not begin 
The testimony specifically addressing the presence of signage at the boundary 
gates came from Brian Okelberry and Jeff Jefferson. Brian Okelberry testified to the 
presence of signs on boundary gates from the 1970's on. (R. 522 at 23-25) Again, such 
testimony is in conflict with the testimony of Lee Okelberry who testified that signs were 
not posted until after he had been phased of his involvement in the operation in the mid-
1990's, when the land was being leased to a hunters group. (R. 521atl99-200) Jeff 
Jefferson, who began to work for the Okelberrys in 1977 at the age of fourteen, testified 
to the presence of signs on all entrances. (R. 521 at 135) He did not indicate when these 
signs first appeared, though perhaps representative, he testified that it was not until 1992 
that a "no trespassing" sign was placed at the Circle Springs entrance. (R. 521 at 131) 
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to restrict access to the roads themselves until the 1990's. In other words, although the 
Okelberrys presented some evidence of some locked gates and some evidence of no-
trespassing signs, the trial court found that these acts were not considered to be an 
attempt to restrict access to the roads, nor did they cause access to the roads to be 
restricted. It was the trial court's finding that access to the roads themselves only began 
to be restricted in the early 1990s. Under these circumstances the trial court again found 
that the standard found in Boyer v. Clark, 7 Utah 2d 395, 397, 326 P. 2d 107, 109 (Utah 
1958), had been met: the public, "though not consisting of a great many persons," had 
used these roads "as often as they found it convenient or necessary." (R, 415) 
III. The Court of Appeals Correctly Applied the Standards Required by this 
Court for Dedication of a Road to the Public under 72-2-104. 
The Court of Appeals correctly applied the standards set by this Court in 
reviewing the Okelberrys' claims and in upholding the trial court's decision. The court 
of appeals considered two general claims made by the Okelberrys: first, that the trial 
court's Findings of Fact were not supported by sufficient evidence; and second, that the 
trial court incorrectly determined that the four roads had been abandoned and dedicated 
to the public pursuant to the dedication statute. 
1. The Trial Court's Findings of Fact Were Properly Reviewed and Correctly 
Upheld. 
The standard of review for a sufficiency of the evidence claim is based on Utah 
Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) and In re Z.D. 2006 UT 54, ^ 29, 147 P.3d 401. Rule 52(a) 
states in part, "Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not 
be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of 
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the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses." In order to conduct this analysis, 
a reviewing court must make a review of the entire record taking into consideration any 
heightened standard of review required by the case, In re Z.D., at. ^ 3 9 - 4 0 . Then the 
factual findings should only be set aside if they are against the clear weight of the 
evidence or if the reviewing court reaches a firm and definite conviction that a mistake 
has been made. Id. (citing State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987)); See also, 
Western Kane County v. Jackson Cattle Co., 1AA P.2d 1376, 1377 (Utah 1987). 
This is exactly what the court of appeals did. As stated in its opinion, the court of 
appeals reviewed the record as a whole to see if the trial court's findings of fact were 
clearly erroneous, taking into account the applicable burden of proof: clear and 
convincing evidence. W&satch County v. Okelberiy, 2006 UT App 473, ^ 9 , 153 P.3d 
745. The court looked to determine whether the trial court's findings were against the 
clear weight of the evidence and whether they were left with a definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake had been made. Id. at \ 9. The court of appeals noted that the 
trial court's findings were not against the clear weight of the evidence and that they did 
not have a firm and definite conviction that a mistake had been made. Id. at [^ ^20, 24, 25. 
It further noted that the record contained sufficient evidence to support the trial court's 
findings, Id. at f 20, and identified some of the evidence that did so. Id. at f^ 24. It used 
the correct standard to review the sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim and properly upheld 
the trial court's findings of fact. 
2. The Trial Court's Ultimate Conclusion Was Properly Reviewed and Correctly 
Upheld. 
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The standard of review to determine whether a trial court's decision in a road-
dedication case meets the requirements of the law was articulated by this Court in Heber 
City Corp. v. Simpson, 942 P.2d 307 (Utah 1997). There it stated that the correct 
standard is to "review the decision for correctness but grant the court significant 
discretion in its application of the facts to the statute," and to "require proof of dedication 
by clear and convincing evidence." Heber City, at 310 (citing Draper City v. Estate of 
Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097, 1099 (Utah 1995); citing Thomson v. Condas, 27 Utah 2d 129, 
130, 493 P.2d 639, 639 (1972)). This Court noted that granting this discretion to a trial 
court in a road dedication case is appropriate because, other than the ten year 
requirement, the road dedication statute's requirements "are highly fact dependent and 
somewhat amorphous" and the issues to be considered "do not lend themselves well to 
close review by this court, as we would be hard-pressed to establish a coherent and 
consistent statement of the law on a fact-intensive, case-by-case review of trial court 
rulings." id. at 310. 
The court of appeals performed the correct analysis on the Okelberrys' challenge 
to the trial court's ultimate determination that the roads had been dedicated to the public. 
The analysis of this issue is necessarily somewhat redundant. For example, a finding that 
"persons were able to use the road whenever they found it convenient or necessary.. .as a 
o 
public thoroughfare" also can be a conclusion of law. There were, however, three purely 
legal issues argued to the court of appeals which should be discussed. 
8
 Both the trial court and the court of appeals seemed to deal with this redundancy in 
different ways. The trial court presented its findings and conclusions regarding 
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A. The Trial Court Is Not Required to Accept Any Evidence as True. 
One of the Okelberrys' claims which was considered by the court of appeals and 
which the}r again make before this Court is that under the clear and convincing standard, 
the trial court was required to accept as true an)7 evidence not specifically rebutted by 
Wasatch County.9 Stated another way, the Okelberrys argued that the trial court could 
not legally reach the conclusions it did, under the clear and convincing standard, in light 
of the Okelberrys' allegedly "un-rebutted" evidence. 
The Okelberrys cite no legal authority for their proposition. And there are some 
very good reasons why it is not and should not be the law. First, it is virtually impossible 
to specifically rebut some types of evidence. Here, the Okelberrys presented some 
evidence that there were times they asked people using one of the four roads to leave. 
These witnesses did not give a date, time, or place to support their allegation; neither did 
they name a person or even a road that was involved.10 It is impossible to rebut such 
testimony directly. But that doesn't settle the issue. The trier of fact is responsible to sift 
through all the testimony and determine what is corroborated, credible, and persuasive. 
"continuous use" and "public thoroughfare" by limiting itself to "evidence presented" 
findings in its Findings of Fact and then announcing in its Conclusions of Law those 
aspects of the presented evidence that it found to be true. The court of appeals analyzed 
these issues once and then in a blended sort of way showed that the trial court's 
determinations were proper both as factual findings and as legal conclusions. 
9
 The Okelberrys also make the same argument for disputed evidence on pages 38-39 of 
their brief to this Court. But, as the same analysis applies, we will only note it here. 
10
 One such example is Jeff Jefferson. Mr. Jefferson testified that he ejected persons 
using the road, but he could only remember two names and admitted that he encountered 
these persons in 2002 or 2003 long after the relevant time period and when everyone 
agrees that the Okelberrys had begun blocking these roads. (R. 521 at 150) Mr. Jefferson 
also admitted that most of the people were off the road on the Okelberry property. (R. 
521 at 149) 
22 
He should not be required to ignore a great weight of evidence opposed only by vague, 
uncorroborated, and unpersuasive testimony simply because it was narrowly "un-
rebutted." 
Neither does the heightened burden of proof support the Okelberrys' contention. 
If self-serving testimony that cannot be directly refuted were deemed legally impervious 
to corroborated, credible, and persuasive evidence to the contrary, then no criminal 
defendant could ever be convicted under the even-stricter burden of proof of "beyond a 
reasonable doubt." The Okelberrys' proposed rule would raise the burden of proof from 
"clear and convincing," move it past "beyond a reasonable doubt," and create a new, 
impossible-to-meet burden of proof called "all opposing testimony, even that which is 
unbelievable or unpersuasive, has been specifically rebutted." 
B. The Mere Presence of Gates on a Road Does Not Defeat the Dedication 
of That Road. 
Another of the Okelberrys' arguments which was considered by th.e court of 
appeals was whether the presence of gates alone would defeat the statute. The 
Okelberrys argue that the presence of gates where these roads enter their property should, 
as a matter of law, defeat the dedication statute. (Petitioner's brief at 35) The court of 
appeals properly rejected this argument. The court of appeals found that although gates 
are a factor to be considered in a road dedication case, they have never been held by Utah 
courts to defeat the dedication statute by their mere presence. Wasatch County v. 
Okelberry, at ^15. Wasatch County has been unable to find a case where this Court has 
held that the presence of a gate alone will defeat the dedication of a road. But it has 
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found cases where this Court discussed a gate as only one of several factors in making a 
determination. See, e.g., Gillmor v. Carter, 15 Utah 2d 280, 283, 391 P.2d 426. 428 
(1964). 
There are good reasons why the presence of a gate alone, especially in the present 
case, should not defeat application of the dedication statute. First, a gate alone does not 
interrupt use. The Okelberrys argue that the act of having to open and close a gate is an 
interruption which should defeat the statute. This is not logical. There are man} things 
which may cause a delay in a person's use of a road, especially on mountain roads such 
as these. Trees can fall across a road causing a traveler to get out and move them. 
Animals or people may be walking in the road. The road may even be bumpy due to 
terrain, or slick due to rain or snow. A gate may need to be opened and closed. All of 
these may slow a person's travel, but none actually interrupts use. 
In the present case the County's witnesses testified that if the gates were up, they 
opened and closed them. If they were down, they left them down. Martin Wall testified 
that "if there was no stock in there [the gates] would be down." (R. 520 at 189) Ed 
Sabey similarly testified that the gates are not always up and that "once the sheep and 
cattle is gone [the gates] were hardly put up, ever. . . ." (R. 520 at 271, 292) Ray 
OkelbeiTy testified that the sheep would be on the property from May to June and would 
return at the end of September. (R. 522 at 69-70) Gerald Thompson testified that 
sometimes the gates were open, at other times they were closed. (R. 520 at 244) 
Brandon Richins similarly testified that sometimes the gates were up, sometimes they 
were not. (R. 521 at 12, 25) Shane Ford testified that the gates would be open or closed, 
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depending on which pasture the sheep were in. (R. 521 at 232) Lee Okelberry also 
testified that the gates were not up at all times during the summer. (R. 521 at 97) The 
County's witnesses all used the roads whenever they found it convenient or necessary, 
regardless of whether a gate happened to be up or down at the time. 
Second, the type and use of a gate should be considered. There is a significant 
difference between a wire gate on a wire fence in rural sheep and cattle country and 
wrought-iron gates on a fence around a person's back yard. Each shows a completely 
different use. In this case the gates were clearly livestock gates on livestock fences. 
Testimony indicated that the primary purpose of the gates was to keep the livestock on 
Okelberry property, not to control use of the road by the public. (R. 522 at 25) 
(testimony of Brian Okelberry that "the purpose of the gates . . . is to keep the sheep in 
tack"). If sheep were to wander off the property the Okelberrys would be fined by the 
Forest Service. (R. 521 at 135) Lee Okelberry testified that cattle guards were put in 
because the wire gates would sometimes get cut off or rolled back, indicating that first 
and foremost, the purpose of the gates was livestock control. (R. 521 at 198) 
Third, in the early years these roads were being used by the public many things 
were different from the way they are now. Wasatch County was much more 
agriculturally based than it is currently. There were fewer people, more farms, and more 
livestock. People, especially in outlying areas which are even now considered rural, were 
used to seeing and using livestock gates. Cattle guards were much less prevalent than in 
today's world. A gate simply did not have the same meaning it may have today. And it 
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was in this environment that these roads first took life, developing into well-used and 
necessary access to Forest Service and other public lands. 
C. The "Balancing Test": The Occasional Locking of a Gate Does Not 
Defeat the Dedication of a Road. 
Also considered by the court of appeals is the Okelberrys' argument that a single 
locking of a gate, or a single expulsion from a road precludes the application of the 
dedication statute. Wasatch County v. Okelbeny, at ^[14. In properly rejecting this 
argument the court of appeals articulated, perhaps more specifically than it had been done 
in the past, the nature of weighing an occasional locked gate. This is the "balancing test" 
complained of by the Okelberrys as being a corruption of this Court's precedent. This is 
simply not the case. 
The court of appeals stated that the trial court should "weigh the evidence 
regarding the duration and frequency that a gate was locked against the frequency and 
volume of public use to determine if there was clear and convincing evidence that the use 
of the road was continuous." The court of appeals also held that, in the present case, the 
trial court correctly balanced such evidence in finding continuous use. Inherent in this 
balancing test is the understanding that the locking of a gate or other blocking of a road, 
even though not intended to defeat the statute, if it occurs often and long enough may, on 
its own, interrupt continuous use. 
The Okelberrys claim that the court of appeal's "test" is a change in the law which 
will have far-reaching effects. As will be shown, this test is nothing new but rather 
implicit m any such consideration of locked gates or blocked roads. By necessity, it has 
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been used in prior cases, but perhaps was articulately described in this case for the first 
time. 
This so-called "test" is derived from the tension embedded in the nature of these 
road-dedication cases. As discussed above, this Court's holding in Thurman v. Bryam, 
626 P.2d 447, established that a periodic blocking of the road to move sheep did not 
defeat the dedication statute. On the other side of such facts is the case of Campbell v. 
Box Elder County, 962, P.2d 806 (Utah App. 1998), where the court of appeals properly 
held that a road that was always blocked by a locked gate except for periodic temporary 
unlocking during hunting season would not establish continuous use. 
Somewhere between these two cases is a tipping point where, under the clear and 
convincing standard, the road is or is not blocked often and long enough for the 
continuous use element to be met. Frankly there is really no other way to describe how to 
analyze this one factor than to characterize it as a balancing exercise. Depending on the 
other factors present in a case, the tipping point may not always be the same. This type 
of analysis is clearly part of the "highly fact dependent and somewhat amorphous" 
dedication requirements which necessitate that the trial courts be allowed significant 
discretion to apply the law to the facts of a particular case. 
The court of appeals did not say that this was the only factor that the trial court 
considered in this case, or even that it was the most important factor. It really only stated 
that the trial court had properly considered this factor and still found continuous use by 
clear and convincing evidence. The "balancing test" is simply a description of what, by 
necessity, trial courts must perform any time they have a road-dedication case in which 
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the road may have been temporarily blocked. The helpful description, while not creating 
new law, may give useful guidance to trial courts in future cases. 
Even if this Court is convinced that the language regarding a balancing test is 
problematic, it still should affirm the holding in this case. As shown above, the trial court 
listened to all of the evidence, grappled with the unique facts of this case, and considered 
the totality of the circumstances, having the opportunity to judge, first-hand, the relative 
credibility of the evidence presented. Having done so the trial court held that the 
evidence was both clear and convincing. It concluded that the requirements of the 
dedication statute had been met. Thus the trial court fulfilled the obligations placed upon 
it both by statute and case law. 
D. Finding no Legally Conclusive Issue, the Court of Appeals Properly 
Considered the Trial Court's Discretion. 
The court of appeals upheld the trial court's findings of fact. It also reviewed the 
conclusions of law under a correctness standard and rejected the Okelberrys' arguments 
that the trial court's holding in this case must be reversed as a matter of law. Finally the 
court of appeals considered whether the trial court's ultimate detennination was correct in 
light of the "significant discretion" granted to a trial court to apply the facts to the law. 
The court of appeals noted that there was "clear and convincing evidence of the frequent 
and general use of the road without the defendants' permission" and held that the trial 
court's findings were sufficient to uphold its determination of dedication. Wasatch 
County v. Okelbeny, at lfij24, 25. 
IV. Any Other Standard is Unworkable. 
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The bright line standards urged by the Okelberrys are unworkable. If one single 
instance of a person being unable to use the road is sufficient to defeat the statute, the 
dedication statute would, as a practical matter, be entirely unenforceable. There would 
not be a single landowner who couldn't claim, and maybe legitimately so, that at least 
once during the relevant period someone was not able to use the road. Whether because a 
tree had fallen, there was deep snow or mud, the road looked too rugged, a gate was 
closed, or any number of other reasons, someone at some time will have been turned back 
from using any road. 
Similarly, if the landowner's intent in attempting to close a road becomes entirely 
determinative, then the statute also becomes useless. A landowner could easily claim that 
he blocked the road for a week, a day, or an hour when nobody noticed. Or he could 
claim that he intended to block the road and keep people out to defeat the statute even if 
the means he used to do so failed to stop a single traveler. 
When one considers the many different types of roads to which the statute may 
apply, it shows that the flexibility in the standard is there for good reason: it gives up very 
little in clarity but gains everything in adaptability. The court of appeal's articulation 
furthers both the standard's clarity and its adaptability. Weighing the durations and 
frequencies of road-closures against the frequency and volume of public use is an 
intuitive and effective way to apply Utah's statute to rural roads bordering remote Forest 
Service property and to busy metropolitan streets crisscrossing a private university. For 
example, a single hour of closure on a road that sees 60,000 cars a day may be sufficient 
to interrupt "continuous use"; but an entire week of closure on a remote road that sees 
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on]}' a dozen or two travelers a month would probably nor interrupt ''continuous use.'' 
The flexibility built into the standard has proven effective for many years and should 
probably not be disturbed now. 
1. This Court Could Articulate a Safe-Harbor to Allow for Situations of 
Permissive Use. 
Wasatch County recognizes that there are situations in which a landowner may 
want to allow permissive use of a private road but maintain certainty that the road will 
not become public under the dedication statute. Such a situation may be sufficiently 
beneficial to the public that it is generally in everyone's best interest to encourage such 
permissive use and still provide the landowner with the certainty of a safe harbor. The 
standards already set by this Court under the dedication statute would clearly allow for 
the articulation of a safe harbor. And such a harbor may be articulated without overruling 
or disavowing any of this Court's precedent and without reversing the court of appeals or 
trial court in this case. 
An example of such a beneficial situation where a landowner has allowed 
permissive use while taking reasonable, necessary, and verifiable steps to defeat the 
dedication statute and maintain the private nature of the road is amicus curie Brigham 
Young University. As shown in its amicus briefs filed both in this case and in the case of 
Town of Leads v. Prisby, Docket No. 20061085, also currently pending in this Court, 
Brigham Young University has taken purposeful, reasonable, and verifiable actions to 
maintain the private nature of their roads. One would believe that a trial court presented 
with such facts would easily and swiftly find that the dedication statute had not been met. 
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For ease of application and certainty of result, a safe harbor would probably need 
to have the following elements. First the landowner would have to periodically close the 
road to public use for the primary purpose of disrupting the application of the dedication 
statute. Second the road closure should occur at an interval of less than ten years, and the 
road should remain closed at least for a minimum length of time, such as 24 hours. Third 
the landowner should be required to make reasonable efforts to put the highway 
authority, local government, and public at large on notice of the reason for, the time of, 
and the duration of such road closures. Fourth the landowner could create and preserve 
evidence of such interruptions and the notices given. 
One obvious concern about judicially creating a safe harbor is that, due to their 
clarity and precedential authority, such harbors can sometimes evolve into a "fence"— 
i.e., minimum standards. Colloquially, this is described as "turning the floor into the 
ceiling." However, where the standard is based on a statute, such as here, such an 
evolution is less likely. And clear language from this Court could also be used to prevent 
it. Consequently, it is possible that the benefits of a safe harbor may provide a reasonable 
judicial response to the concerns expressed by the Okelberrys and their amicus. 
V, Issues Raised for the First Time before this Court Should Not be Considered. 
1. De Novo Review on Appeal 
The Okelberrys raise two other issues in their brief to this Court which should be 
rejected. Their first claim is that in light of the constitutional issues involved with private 
property, the Court of Appeals should have reviewed, de novo, the trial court's 
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application of the law to the facts. Petitioner's brief at page 8. There are two problems 
with this claim. 
First, the Okelberrys make no showing of where they raised this issue to the court 
of appeals or how this issue arose from the court of appeals decision. Because they fail to 
make either of these showings, this issue should not be considered. DeBiy v. Noble. 889 
P.2d 428, 444 (Utah 1995). (Even issues raised in the petition for certiorari, will not be 
addressed unless first raised to court of appeals or if issue arose out of the court of 
appeals' decision.) 
Second, the argument made by the Okelberrys would require this Court to rule 
against its own longstanding precedent giving trial courts "significant discretion in its 
application of the facts to the statute." In effect the trial court would be given no 
discretion whatsoever in applying the facts to the law. The Okelberrys have not made the 
showing required to get this Court to overrule the standards set by years of case law. 
Lany v. Fairview City, 2002 UT 795 ^[45, 57 P.3d 1007. (To overturn precedent court 
must be clearly convinced that originally rule was wrong or is no longer sound due to 
changing conditions and that change will cause more good than harm) 
2. Constitutional Taking 
The second new claim is that a road dedication under the statute is a potential 
"constitutional taking" and therefore entitled to higher scrutiny. This claim was not 
raised to the court of appeals, nor have the Okelberrys made a showing of how the issue 
arose from the court of appeals decision. 
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The Okelberrys are also incorrect in their analysis of this issue. A constitutional 
taking occurs when the executive branch of the government takes official action which 
results in the loss of an individual's property. Abandonment occurs when a person fails 
to properly protect a property right, or potential property right, from loss to the public. 
The best example of this is in patent or copyright law. Patents or copyrights can be lost 
to the public domain if not properly protected as required by law. Road dedication cases, 
like patent litigation, involve the government only in determining whether the property 
right has been lost or abandoned. 
One difference between patent or copyright litigation and road-dedication cases is 
that the executive branch, in this case the County, is given the responsibility to protect 
public roads, but the federal government has no duty to preserve patents or copyrights. 
However, the underlying issues are the same: in neither case is the government the entity 
taking the property right; it is preserved or lost by the individual. 
CONCLUSON 
The trial court applied the correct legal standards to the issue of whether the four 
roads had been abandoned and dedicated to the public. Its findings of fact and 
conclusions of law were supported by the clear weight of the evidence. The court of 
appeals applied the correct standards in reviewing the trial court's decision and properly 
upheld the dedication of the four roads. 
The factors weighed by the court of appeals are intuitive, adaptable, and helpful in 
applying the statute. Its decision should also be affirmed. If this Court desires to further 
articulate the factors to weigh, or if it desires to create a safe harbor for owners of private 
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roads, it may do so without disturbing the public's right to access state- and federal 
owned land lying behind the Okelberrys' propeity. 
vrfS DATED th is^ 0 day of July, 2007. 
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